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Abstract: The American politics literature on representation focuses on voters and elected 
officials, but a growing group of political scientists is arguing that more should be done to study 
interest groups.  Yet there already is a large literature on interest groups—and it has struggled to 
show evidence of interest group influence.  I argue here that the interest group literature’s near-
exclusive focus on the federal government has hindered its progress: basic questions have gone 
unasked, important interest groups have gone underappreciated, and the amount of influence has 
been underestimated.  By studying U.S. subnational policymaking, scholars would discover 
different constellations of interest groups, and they would find that the variation in subnational 
governments allows for empirical designs that are better able to detect interest group influence 
when it exists.  The payoffs of a subnational focus would be substantial—both for our 
understanding of interest groups and for the study of political representation. 
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Interest groups used to be at the heart of the study of American politics (e.g., 
Schattschneider 1960; Dahl 1961), but they aren’t today.  For the last few decades, the broad 
theories that have motivated most of the research in the American politics subfield have 
neglected interest groups, and have instead put the emphasis on voters, elected officials, and their 
linkages through elections (Downs 1957; see Hacker and Pierson 2014).  As a result, the 
American politics literature on representation has become one largely about how well the 
positions of political elites align with citizens’ preferences.  The representation of other political 
actors, such as organized groups, has been treated as a peripheral matter, as though questions 
about interest group influence are somehow separate from studies of political representation.  
Very recently that has started to change.  Hacker and Pierson (2014) have argued that the 
American politics subfield’s reliance on the Downsian theoretical framework has come at the 
expense of its “substantive bite”:  key political and policy phenomena of interest, such as 
asymmetric party polarization and rising economic inequality, are difficult or impossible to 
explain with theoretical models centered on elections and voter turnout.  The corrective, say 
Hacker and Pierson, is an alternative approach—one that conceives of politics as a struggle to 
shape public policy, and one that brings organized groups back to their rightful place as central 
actors in American politics.  And it is not only Hacker and Pierson who favor such a corrective.  
Today, growing group of political scientists is pushing American politics scholars to once again 
make interest groups a sustained subject of research, asserting that interest group influence needs 
to be studied if we want to fully understand how well American government represents its 
citizens (e.g., Bawn et al. 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Anzia and Moe 2015; Moe 2015).     
This is an exciting juncture in American politics research, but also an awkward one.  It is 
awkward because there is an existing literature on interest groups—quite a large one—much of 
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which has been devoted to the very question of whether interest groups have influence.  Its 
conclusions, moreover, are decidedly mixed.  Some studies do uncover evidence of influence, 
but just as many turn up little or none (Smith 1995; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Burnstein and 
Linton 2002; Hojnacki et al. 2012).  Tellingly, in the most comprehensive interest group study of 
the past decade, Baumgartner et al. (2009) study over 1,000 groups on 98 national policy issues 
and find that interest groups’ resources have little to no relationship with whether the groups get 
what they want.  Interest group scholar Beth Leech (2010, 553) sums up the situation well:  
“For those who try to quantify and systematically measure [interest group] influence…it 
has proved illusive…Almost everyone believes that interest groups are influential, and 
yet systematic studies have as often pointed to the limits on interest group influence as 
have concluded that strong influence exists.”  
This is no minor stumbling block.  Effectively, what we currently have is a growing call 
for American politics scholars to do more to study interest group influence and a large existing 
literature on that very subject that finds few signs that interest groups have any influence at all.  
So how do we proceed?  For scholars hoping to heed the call for more research on interest 
groups, how should we go about doing it?  And how do we make sense of and learn from the 
vast body of research on interest groups that already exists?   
 I argue here that there is a particular feature of the interest group literature that has 
hindered its progress and prevented it from finding clearer evidence of interest group influence: 
its near-exclusive focus on the federal government.  The vast majority of research on interest 
groups has centered on national politics, and, within that, mostly on the U.S. Congress (see 
Hojnacki et al. 2012).  In large part because of this national focus, basic questions have gone 
unasked, important types of interest groups have gone underappreciated, and the overall amount 
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of interest group influence in the country has been underestimated.  Even more importantly, 
because the national context requires scholars to leverage variation within a single government, 
the whole enterprise of studying interest groups has developed into one that is not well set up to 
detect interest group influence, even when it exists.   
 The study of interest group influence would therefore benefit greatly from a shift to 
studying U.S. subnational policymaking.  By turning from a single government that is awash in 
interest groups to sets of governments with considerable variation in interest group activity, 
scholars would recognize the need for a theoretical logic to explain that variation.  They would 
discover different constellations of interest groups—constellations in which groups like unions 
often have a much larger presence than they do at the national level.  They would discover 
contexts with less inter-group competition and weaker partisan and ideological constraints—both 
of which stand to enhance interest group influence.  And with 50 states and almost 90,000 local 
governments, there is no need to limit analysis to variation within a single government.  The 
subnational context offers thousands of cases, each with their own interest groups, and each with 
their own policies.  The main challenge, as with any work on U.S. subnational politics, is data 
availability.  But that is both a challenge and an opportunity.  Given the potential for subnational 
research to revive the study of interest group influence, it is a challenge well worth taking on. 
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Interest Group Activity 
 The place to start is with interest group activity, broadly defined.1  After all, before we 
can get to questions of whether interest groups affect outcomes, we first need to know the lay of 
the land:  Are interest groups active?  Which ones?  How active are they?  On what issues, and 
under what conditions?2  The interest group literature only addresses some of these questions, 
and even for those it does address, it doesn’t do so in a way that establishes a solid foundation for 
the study of interest group influence. 
Consider this very basic question:  Under what conditions are interest groups active in a 
government?  Or, alternatively, what explains the overall amount of interest group activity in a 
government?  A scholar looking only at the federal government wouldn’t bother to ask such 
questions, because it is well known that there are thousands of active interest groups in 
Washington, DC.  At the subnational level, however, the answers to these questions are less 
obvious.  We know interest groups are active in state politics, but what explains variation in the 
overall amount of interest group activity from state to state?  Local governments are even more 
                                                          
1 Most research on interest groups examines campaign contributions and lobbying, but interest 
group activity can also mean mobilizing voters, providing publicity for campaigns, nominating 
and endorsing candidates, and more.    
2 Answering these questions does not necessarily require scholars to “solve” the related puzzle of 
why individuals join groups.  That puzzle has been a hurdle since Olson (1965), but the fact of 
the matter is that groups do become politically active—many of them—and so we should go 
about explaining patterns of that activity.  See helpful discussions of this in Wilson (1995) and 
Gray and Lowery (1996).   
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of a mystery.  They have less in common with the federal government than the states do (see 
Berry 2010), and we can’t even say for sure that interest groups are always active in local politics 
(see Peterson 1981; Oliver 2012).  Not only are there no readily available datasets on local 
interest groups, but also the interest group literature doesn’t offer a general theory to tell us what 
to expect.  Aside from Moe’s (2005, 2006) studies of teacher unions in school districts and a few 
studies of mostly large cities (e.g., Cooper et al. 2005; Feiock et al. 2014), we have little sense of 
how interest group activity varies across local governments.   
The near-total lack of data is a disadvantage to studying interest groups at the local level, 
but it’s also an opportunity, because it frees scholars from the temptation of crafting studies 
based on what can be answered with available data.  In local politics, we are forced to start with 
theory.  And we are free to begin with what interest groups care about and proceed from there.  
On this, there is near-consensus: interest groups care about public policy.3  Public policy should 
therefore serve as an anchor in the study of interest groups (Hacker and Pierson 2014). 
To explain the overall amount of interest group activity in a government, for example, we 
should start by thinking about what policies are at stake in that government.  Oliver (2012) points 
out that governments vary dramatically in their scope—the number of issues on which they make 
policy decisions—and so we should expect the overall amount of interest group activity to be 
                                                          
3 Interest groups also need to survive (Gray and Lowery 1996), and they need resources and 
access to policymakers to influence policy, but their main goal—the reason they need resources 
and access—is to influence policy.  As Moe explains, we should not just be focused on the 
resources groups have to influence politics, but also their incentives to influence politics (see 
Moe 2011, 2015). 
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positively related to that.  The policy stakes also stand to be larger in governments of 1 million 
people than in governments of 1,000 people, which suggests that larger governments should 
feature more interest group activity than smaller governments.  These are just two basic 
hypotheses, and many more are possible.  But they illustrate how the local context has the 
potential to inspire new thinking about interest groups, and also how what Hacker and Pierson 
call a “policy-focused approach” is a productive one for studying interest group activity. 
The policy-focused approach can also be used to develop expectations about which 
interest groups will be active, how active they will be, and when they will be active (under what 
conditions and on what issues).  These, too, are simple questions—and important stepping stones 
to understanding interest group influence.  However, the existing literature has not produced a 
theory to answer them, in part because it has been focused on the federal government.  
For one thing, studies of the interest group system in Washington, DC, have been mostly 
descriptive.  Using lists of lobbying groups with Washington offices, for example, scholars 
categorize the groups on several dimensions (such as whether they are membership groups or 
institutions) and then use counts of the groups in different categories to draw conclusions about 
whether the interest group system is biased in favor of certain interests (e.g. Schlozman and 
Tierney 1986; Scholzman et al. 2012).  This work has been informative, but it has not led to a 
theory that could explain which interest groups will be active in other governments.   
These studies are also not designed with an eye toward testing interest group influence. 
The group categories in this research are not based on what groups are trying to achieve policy-
wise, and counts of groups do not tell us how large or active the groups are—even though surely 
that matters for influence.  If the ultimate goal were to study influence, it would be more useful 
to categorize interest groups according to their policy goals—and to measure how actively they 
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pursue those goals and with what resources.  But when the jumping-off point is a list of over 
11,000 groups in Washington, DC, that isn’t really possible.  There are too many groups and too 
many issues for such an approach to be realistic. 
Using a policy-focused approach to study interest group activity in the states would be 
more manageable, but so far no one has pursued the opportunity.  There is a sizeable literature on 
state interest group systems pioneered and developed by Gray and Lowery (1996),4 but their 
work isn’t set up to be a launching pad for studying interest group influence.  Like the research 
on the national interest group system, Gray and Lowery’s research relies heavily on databases of 
registered lobbyists, categorizations that aren’t based on groups’ policy goals, and counts of 
groups as a key metric.  While Gray and Lowery do advance a theory, its starting premise is that 
the main goal of interest groups is to survive.  Gray and Lowery therefore set out to answer 
questions such as how many environmental groups or gay rights groups can be sustained in an 
environment with limited space and resources.  Their theoretical account of interest group 
populations is not a policy-focused theory.  It does not start with policy and work backward and 
forward.  And it is not a midway point toward studying interest group influence. 
The study by Baumgartner et al. (2009), in contrast, is designed to study interest group 
influence, and it starts with policies and works outward to document the interest groups active on 
each one, including each group’s policy position.  This is a better set-up for studying influence, 
because the active groups are categorized according to their policy goals.  But it still does not 
answer the question of which interest groups will be active and under what conditions.  For while 
Baumgartner et al. meticulously document which interest groups are active on 98 different 
issues, they do not present a theory to explain the patterns of activity they find. 
                                                          
4 See also Lowery and Gray (2007) for references to their many articles on the subject. 
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This means that if we turn to state and local politics, there isn’t an existing theory we can 
draw on to explain the kinds of interest groups that will be active.  Fortunately, the subnational 
context is an excellent one within which to develop (and test) such a theory, and we can continue 
to use public policy as an anchor.  For questions about which interest groups will be active in a 
government, and how active they will be, we should start by considering what policies a 
government makes and then work outward to think about which groups have a stake in those 
policies.  This would be difficult to do at the national level because there are so many issues.  
But most state governments make policy in fewer areas than the national government, and local 
governments are even more constrained.  As Oliver (2012) explains, municipal government is 
largely concerned with land and money: deciding what can be built and where, and spending on 
public goods such as streets and sanitation and public safety.  By definition, the nation’s special-
purpose governments make policy on a single issue (Berry 2009).  For many local governments, 
then, it is possible to enumerate the most important issues, develop expectations about the 
interest groups that would be active on those issues, and then aggregate up to make predictions 
about the overall composition of the interest group system.  The relative simplicity of local 
government makes this feasible.  
But it is not just the numbers of issues that are different at the state and local level.  The 
issues themselves are also different.  And so if this general approach has merit—if the kinds of 
policies at stake shape the kinds of interest groups that are active—then the composition of state 
and local interest group systems should look quite different than that of the federal government.  
What this suggests, then, is that by focusing almost entirely on national politics, the interest 
group literature is providing an incomplete—and in some ways inaccurate—picture of interest 
group activity in the United States. 
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Unions are a major case of this.  Both the interest group literature and the political 
science literature on labor in the United States have focused mainly on national politics, and for 
reasons that are likely related, they also tend to talk of private-sector unions as though they are 
the sum total of the union movement.  A core theme throughout this literature is that unions are 
weak and in decline (e.g., Dark 1999; Schlozman et al. 2012), which, for private-sector unions, is 
true: fewer than 7% of private-sector workers today are members of unions (Hirsch and 
Macpherson 2018).  But in the public sector, union membership rates are much higher—34% 
across the country—and they have barely budged since the 1980s, even with Republicans’ recent 
moves to roll back collective bargaining rights and ban agency fees.  Moreover, that 34% 
national average masks substantial variation in union membership across states: in New York, 
for example, 67% of all government employees are in unions, whereas in South Carolina, only 
7% are.  Not only are public-sector employees today more organized than private-sector 
employees, but they also now make up a majority of all union members in the United States.  It 
is a big mistake, then, to think of private-sector unions as the sum total of the union movement.  
Why, then, does the American politics literature neglect the importance of public-sector 
unions, both to the union movement and as interest groups in American politics?  Almost 
certainly because public-sector unions are much more active in state and local politics than in 
national politics.  Unlike private-sector unions, whose collective bargaining rights are sanctioned 
by national law (most notably the National Labor Relations Act), public-sector unions are 
granted collective bargaining rights by state laws (see Saltzman 1985; Anzia and Moe 2016).  
These state laws are crucial to the strength of public-sector unions: by simply looking at whether 
states require, allow, or prohibit collective bargaining, and also whether they previously allowed 
agency fees, it is possible to explain a great deal of the variation in government employee union 
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membership across states (Moe 2011).  It makes sense, then, that public-sector unions would be 
more active in state politics than national politics, because up to this point it has been the states 
that have made the policies that most directly affect their membership rates. 
There is another consideration that is even more important, which is that compared to 
private-sector unions, public-sector unions actually have even greater incentive to be active in 
politics—especially in subnational politics.  The reason, quite simply, is that public-sector union 
members are employed by the government.  By getting involved in politics, public-sector unions 
are in the unique position of being able to influence the elections of their employers—the very 
government officials who make key decisions about their members’ jobs, salaries, benefits, and 
working conditions (Moe 2005, 2006; DiSalvo 2015).  In states that require collective bargaining 
(as most do), this means that public-sector unions are helping to select the people who sit on the 
opposite side of the bargaining table.  This is a powerful motivator of political action— one that 
private-sector unions do not share.  And most of the resulting political activity is targeted at state 
and local government, because that’s where most of the government jobs are: out of the roughly 
17 million full-time government jobs in the United States, well over 14 million are state and 
local government jobs (U.S. Census 2012).  By focusing on national politics, then, scholars have 
neglected the governments where most public-sector union activity takes place.   
Anyone who has studied U.S. public-sector unions knows that the place to look for most 
of their activity is state and local politics, and anyone taking a serious look at interest groups in 
state and local politics will be confronted with the reality that public-sector unions are usually 
major players.  Consider the very small body of work on these matters.  Thomas and Hrebenar 
(2004) regularly rank the top 40 most influential interests in the 50 states, and they consistently 
find that state affiliates of the National Education Association vie for the top spot with state 
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chambers of commerce.  Moe (2011) finds that teacher unions spend considerable sums in 
national elections (about $5.4 million in 2008) but that they spend far more in state elections:  
$61.8 million in the 2008 cycle (see also Hartney and Flavin 2011).  In local school board 
elections, teacher unions are typically the most active interest groups, and they are often 
successful in electing their favored candidates (Moe 2005, 2006).  And the activity of public-
sector unions is by no means limited to teachers or to the electoral arena.  Police unions, 
firefighter unions, and correctional officers are often highly active in state and local politics 
(Page 2011; Anzia and Moe 2015); and public-sector unions are active not just in elections but 
also in lobbying, through collective bargaining (Moe 2011; DiSalvo 2015; Anzia and Moe 2015), 
and even as decision-makers in state government agencies (Anzia and Moe forthcoming).  Much 
more work needs to be done on these matters.  But from what has been done so far, it is clear that 
public-sector unions are among the most active groups in state and local politics. 
A sustained focus on subnational policymaking would therefore broaden and deepen our 
understanding of interest group activity in the United States.  It would make it clear that certain 
groups have been underestimated and understudied as a result of the literature’s preoccupation 
with national politics.  It would require scholars to answer questions that remain unasked, and it 
would motivate them to answer existing questions from a policy-focused angle.  Given the 
centrality of policy to what interest groups do, the payoffs of such a focus would be substantial. 
Interest Group Influence 
 The literature’s focus on national politics can also explain some of the difficulties 
researchers have had in their attempts to demonstrate interest group influence.  The first reason is 
that interest groups probably do have more influence at the subnational level than the national 
level.  But second, and more generally, studying interest group influence within a single 
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government brings with it considerable empirical design challenges, and those challenges have 
made it difficult for scholars to detect influence even where it likely exists.  It is in the study of 
interest group influence, then, where the shortcomings of the existing literature are especially 
large, and where the promise of studying subnational policymaking is especially great. 
 Why might interest groups have more influence in state and local politics than in national 
politics?  For starters, there stand to be big differences in the level of interest group competition.  
National politics is intensely competitive, and political battles are often highly salient and well 
publicized.  As Baumgartner et al. (2009) explain, on almost all of their 98 national issues, 
interest groups are mobilized on both sides, clashing with one another.  And when Smith (2000) 
finds little evidence of influence by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, it is largely because the 
Chamber only takes positions on issues that unite the business community—issues on which the 
business community faces intense competition (see Pierson 2015).  By comparison, state and 
especially local governments are smaller in size and scope, and for reasons I discussed above, 
they probably feature fewer active interest groups—making it less likely that any given group 
will face direct group competition over the policies it cares about (see Anzia 2014).  That 
tendency—together with lower levels of citizen knowledge and participation at the subnational 
level—creates conditions that are probably more favorable to the interest groups that are active. 
 Interest group scholars also point to partisanship and ideology as constraints on interest 
group influence (e.g., Leech 2010), and at the subnational level, these forces either vary across 
contexts or are weaker across the board.  States, for example, vary in the extent of their elite 
polarization (Shor and McCarty 2011), and there are at least some important state issues that are 
not intensely partisan, such as public pensions and criminal justice (Anzia and Moe 2017; 
Grumbach 2018).  Local politics tends to be even less partisan and ideological: most local 
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elections are non-partisan, and the issues that define local politics are custodial rather than 
ideological in nature (Oliver 2012).  Thus, if forces of partisanship and ideology limit interest 
group influence, then we should find more influence overall in subnational politics. 
 But these substantive differences are not the only reason scholars should turn their sights 
to subnational politics to understand interest group influence.  Such as step would also come with 
significant methodological advantages, because the variation in subnational governments allows 
for empirical designs that are much better able to detect interest group influence when it exists.   
 To explain why, it helps to first step back and consider why a focus on public policy is so 
important to the study of interest group influence—and also why public policy should be central 
to the study of representation more generally.  The first claim is simpler: if interest groups care 
about public policy, then to assess whether interest groups have influence, naturally we should be 
focused on the extent to which they get policy to reflect their interests.  Did large banks succeed 
in inserting favorable provisions into the Volker Rule?  Did teacher unions successfully limit the 
number of charter schools?  Are automakers happy with emissions standards?  In the study of 
interest group influence, the obvious dependent variable to be studied is public policy. 
 But public policy and interest group influence should also be central to the broader study 
of representation.  As I described earlier, mainstream research on political representation has 
proceeded as though one only needs to study the alignment between political elites and the mass 
citizenry to assess whether representation is working well.  Perhaps this might be justified if 
policy outcomes always aligned perfectly with citizen preferences, but what about when they 
don’t?  Surely we should consider interest group influence as a possible contributor.  And that’s 
just the beginning.  Mainstream studies of representation typically rely on public opinion as the 
benchmark against which representation is to be evaluated, and yet a substantial body of research 
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raises serious questions about whether alignment between elite and public opinion is really a sign 
of well-functioning representation (e.g., Lenz 2012; Achen and Bartels 2016).  There are also 
issues on which the public does not have meaningful opinions (e.g., Zaller 1992; Anzia and Moe 
2017), and situations in which citizens have opinions on outcomes but not on the specific 
policies that produce those outcomes (e.g., Arnold 1992).  The absence of a public opinion 
benchmark does not make these issues irrelevant to the study of representation.  Actually, these 
are the kinds of issues on which interest groups are in the best position to push policy in their 
favor (Bawn et al. 2012).  My point here is that just like interest group scholars, representation 
scholars should be studying the content of public policy.  They should be thinking about whether 
and when policy is in the public interest, even if the public isn’t paying close attention. 
That brings us to one of the major problems with using the national government to study 
interest group influence: it is a single government, and so at any point in time, the overall content 
of public policy is fixed.  This is a problem because researchers studying causal questions are in 
the business of making comparisons.  To make comparisons, we need variation.  And to find 
variation in the federal government context, where overall public policy is fixed at any given 
point in time, scholars have either turned to variation in policymakers’ positions on issues, or 
they have made comparisons across issues.  Both maneuvers have the effect of removing the 
content of public policy from the dependent variable, and both are a set-up for underestimating 
interest group influence.  
Consider studies that look to the roll call votes of members of Congress for evidence of 
influence.  Such studies can certainly be productive and informative, but it is not always clear 
how legislators’ votes and positions are connected to actual policy outcomes (e.g., Mayhew 
1974).  Also, policy is ultimately shaped by both decisions and non-decisions (Hacker and 
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Pierson 2010; Moe 2015), and interest groups can exercise influence by blocking issues from 
reaching the agenda.  The special sets of issues that actually come to a roll call vote are probably 
the most salient, contentious ones—the ones on which interest group influence tends to be 
limited (e.g., Pierson 2015).  Thus, while stated positions and roll call votes do offer a solution to 
the design problem of limited policy variation in the federal government, it is a solution that 
leads scholars to look for influence in places where they are less likely to find it. 
Another way of creating outcome variation in a single government is to examine 
variation across issue areas (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; Gilens and Page 2014).  The problem 
here is that policy outcomes are not comparable across issue areas: there is no way to say, for 
example, whether auto emissions standards are friendlier to interest groups than abortion policy.  
To resolve this dilemma, scholars shift from studying policy to policy change, asking—for each 
issue—whether the policy changed or the status quo persisted.  Then, by coding whether interest 
groups prefer policy change or the status quo, scholars can test whether interest groups that are 
more active, or that have more resources, are more likely to get the outcome they prefer—in a 
way that is comparable across issues.   
The main problem with this maneuver is one that Baumgartner et al. (2009)—who use 
this approach—identify: if an interest group is influential, it is quite likely that the status quo 
policy already embeds that influence.  In fact, perhaps the interest group is so influential that it 
has already succeeded in getting most of what it wants, such that further changes in its 
direction—even if the group prefers it—are unlikely.  In this scenario, we would certainly not 
want to conclude that the interest group is weak just because the policy did not change.  Instead, 
we would want to somehow measure the friendliness of the status quo policy to the interest 
group.  But with this approach, we can’t do that, because again, we cannot compare the interest-
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group-friendliness of auto emissions policy and abortion policy.  And so in an effort to find 
variation in a single government, scholars have to treat all status quo policies as equal, regardless 
of how much interest groups may have influenced the status quo. 
Even beyond the tendency of these studies to underestimate interest group influence, 
there is a certain irony to all of this.  Scholars care about interest group influence out of a 
concern about the content of public policy and whether it is in the public interest, and yet to 
make possible studies of interest group influence in the national context, they have removed the 
substance of policy from their outcome variables.  The result is a body of work that does not 
actually say much about how public policy is different (or not) because of interest group 
influence—even though presumably that was the motivation behind the inquiry.   
Yet none of these contortions are necessary.  Instead of thinking about what is possible 
within a study of the federal government, we should instead think about how best to study 
interest group influence and then find an environment with suitable conditions.  And if we want 
to understand interest group influence because we care about how it might impact public policy, 
then we should be doing more to explain policy—full stop—and recognize some of the 
limitations of analyzing policy change, legislators’ positions on policy, or roll call votes.  When 
possible, we should focus on the substance of public policy, explore variation in the substance of 
that policy, and then see whether that variation can be explained by variation in interest group 
activity, resources, or strength. 
By studying subnational policymaking, we do not have to compare across issues, nor do 
we have to look to roll call votes for evidence of interest group influence.  The U.S. states offer 
50 units that make policy on many of the same issues, including 50 policies on auto emissions 
and 50 policies on abortion.  Across local governments, there are thousands of versions of land-
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use policy, thousands of approaches to law enforcement and policing, and thousands of local 
education policies.  In principle, then, we can measure policies of the same type across many 
units, and once we have done a proper job of explaining variation in interest group activity 
across those units—which groups are active, and how active they are—we can begin to test 
whether that interest group activity shapes the public policies governments produce.  Studies of 
this kind would be less likely to understate interest group influence, because the outcomes being 
studied would reflect the totality of interest group success on the issue.  Importantly, they would 
also yield insights into how public policy is different (or not) as a result of interest groups. 
There has already been some productive work that adopts this approach, including work 
studying the policy effects of government employee unions (e.g., Moe 2011; Hartney and Flavin 
2011; Anzia and Moe 2015, forthcoming; DiSalvo and Kucik 2017), state business associations 
and conservative networks (Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2016; Hertel-Fernandez forthcoming), and 
even the lobbying efforts of governments themselves (Payson 2018).  Perhaps tellingly, each one 
finds some evidence that groups are shaping the policy outcomes they care about.  In addition, 
there is existing work that leverages rich variation in subnational political institutions to better 
understand the conditions under which interest groups have influence (Gerber 1999; Matsusaka 
2004; Anzia 2014).  But these studies are just the beginning. Much more can and should be done.   
Caveats and Conclusion 
 If subnational politics has such potential for the study of interest group influence, then 
why have so few interest group scholars ventured out into this territory?  One possibility is that 
political scientists often consider state and local politics to be inherently less interesting or less 
important than national politics.  But there is no good justification for this.  State and local 
governments account for half of all public spending in the U.S.; employ more than 14 million 
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government workers; and make major policy decisions about education, law enforcement, health 
policy, criminal justice policy, and much more.  If this is a reason why interest group scholars 
have focused almost exclusively on national government, it certainly isn’t a good one. 
 A second possibility is that interest group scholars actually view studies on many issues 
(in the federal government) as superior to those that only study one or two issues across states or 
cities, perhaps out of concern that the findings of single-issue studies are not generalizable.  I 
would agree that we ultimately want to work toward theories of interest groups that carry across 
issues and contexts.  But studies of single issues across government units can contribute a great 
deal to such an effort, and as I have explained here, studies that compare across multiple issues 
often build in design problems that significantly impede progress—actually preventing us from 
getting closer to meaningful and generalizable findings about interest group influence. 
 Almost certainly the main reason for the dearth of research on state and local interest 
groups is the shortage of easily accessible data.  At the state level, there are datasets of registered 
lobbyists and campaign contributions, but anyone wishing to research interest groups’ activity 
beyond those forms has to collect new data (e.g., Anzia and Moe forthcoming; Hertel-Fernandez 
forthcoming).  Scholars are starting to do more to assemble and analyze data on state policies 
(e.g., Caughey et al. 2017; Grumbach 2018), but so far little has been done to use data on state 
policies to study interest group influence.  The situation is worse at the local level, where not 
only are there no existing datasets of interest group activity, but there also aren’t many readily 
available datasets of local policies beyond public finance outcomes.  This means that scholars 
wanting to take advantage of the richness of the subnational context discover that doing so would 
require the collection of entirely new data—both on interest group activity and on public policy.  
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 As I said earlier, however, this is both an obstacle and an opportunity.  Interest group 
scholar Allan Cigler (1994, 29) has written that “data availability has been the major determinant 
of the interest group politics research agenda, framing both the questions we explore, and the 
topics we avoid.”  Because of this, much of the interest group literature has been constructed 
around existing datasets of interest group activity in national politics—and has resulted in a large 
body of work that is not well set up to detect interest group influence even when it exists.  So we 
should not let the shortage of data and the necessity of collecting new data stop us from studying 
subnational politics.  For even if it is practically a desert when it comes to data, it is practically a 
promise land when it comes to the variation in policy and interest group activity that we need to 
make progress in the study of interest group influence and representation. 
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